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Abstract
While the 1995 entrants to the EU are by now fully integrated, those
joining in 2004 still “enjoy” a secondary status for a number of years. We
attribute this difference to the fact that unlike the former EFTA members
joining in 1995, the 2004 entrants formed a group with heterogenous in-
terests, one that lacked the same strong internal economic ties. Not being
able to act as a unified block they had a considerably weaker bargaining
position. We support our arguments by qualitative results from a simple
model, a dynamic partition function game based on Yi (1997) and Morelli
and Penelle (1997).
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1 Introduction
The post-World War II division of Europe was soon mirrored in the European
trading blocks: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (or Comecon), the
Marshall Plan growing to become the predecessor of the European Union and
the looser European Free Trade Association, but not for long. First, we saw a
migration of members from the EFTA to the European Economic Community,
then the former Comecon members sought entry and most of them have already
joined the EU.
The 1995 and 2004 extensions of the EU have been remarkably different.
The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden is without doubt a success de-
spite the fact that trade was already so open that there was not much to gain,
except perhaps in the case of Finland, who had a rather restrictive agricultural
policy (Flam, 1995). On the other hand, the feelings about the 2004 expansion
are mixed (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006): The enlargement was much
delayed, required a number of concessions and it will be several years before
the new entrants can enjoy the same status as former members: we can cite
here both the Agenda 2000 agreements (Widgre´n, 2006) on limiting the new
entrants’ budget receipts and the restrictions on labour mobility. One feels that
Schuman’s original ideas “about the equity between all countries” suffered an
injury. This is no doubt partly due to the unprecedented differences between
entrants and old members, the cost of the expansion, the entrants’ poor eco-
nomic performance and lack of political maturity. In this paper we look at the
differences in bargaining position, discussing both possibilities and the actual
actions taken, using a game theoretic approach.
Our model is based on a game in a per member partition function form
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(Thrall and Lucas, 1963), a generalisation of the characteristic function form
that accounts for externalities. Concerning the nature of these externalities we
use three conditions expressed by Yi (1997). Finally, we consider a dynamic
extension of this model (Seidmann and Winter, 1998; Gomes, 2005), where
players can collect payoffs along the entire process (Morelli and Penelle, 1997;
Konishi and Ray, 2003).
After the introduction of the notation, terminology and a historical overview
we will discuss the accession game, where a number of applicants try seek entry
to the Union, following an optimal path (Morelli and Penelle, 1997): a sequence
of coalition structures that maximises the present value of payoffs.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a dynamic extension of a cooperative game with externalities where
the payoffs are determined by a partition function (Thrall and Lucas, 1963). A
partition function assigns a characteristic function to each partition; therefore
the same coalition may have different payoffs in different partitions. Our focus
is on the size of coalitions rather than on the distribution of coalitional payoffs
so we consider a per-member partition function. Due to this symmetry all that
matters is the partition of players and the size of the coalition a player belongs
to. The usual definitions simplify to the following:
Let n denote the number of players. A group of players is a coalition and
is denoted by its size m ≤ n. A coalition structure P = {m1, . . . ,mk} is a
partition of n. Π(m) collects partitions of m. The set Π(n) will be denoted Π.
Definition 1 The pair (n, v) is a per-member partition game if n is a number
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of players and v is a function that assigns to each player i belonging to coalition
m embedded in partition P its payoff v(m,P). Formally v : Π→ (N→ R).
Without loss of generality it is assumed that v(m,P) ≥ 0, and v(m,P) = 0
whenever m 6∈ P, so v(n,P) > 0 is only possible if P = {N}.
Now we consider the dynamic extension of this model. Starting from an
initial partition a group of players leaves its current coalitions and forms a
new (sub)partition, the new partition becomes the status quo and the process
continues. Players collect payoffs during the entire process, these payoffs are
aggregated by discounting using a common discount factor 0 ≤ δ < 1. Players
are foresighted, maximise the present value of their future payoffs. This setup
generalises the standard myopic and farsighted models (Chwe, 1994; Xue, 1997,
1998; Ray and Vohra, 1997) where payoff is only collected in the first/last period.
As a result we are not only interested on the final outcome of the process, but
also the path to get there (Morelli and Penelle, 1997).
Players are denoted by a pair (m,P) consisting of their coalitionm embedded
in partition P. If identical players end up in coalitions of different sizes, they
are assigned by lotteries. Thus, symmetry is preserved in the dynamic game.
We call the sequence pi = {P0,P1,P2, . . . } a path. We will restrict our
attention to paths satisfying Pi+1 ∈ Πf (Pi), where Πf (P) denotes the set
of feasible partitions as results of deviations from P. Let Pt (pi) denote the
partition after playing the game t times along pi.
Let w(m,pi) denote the expected present value (or simply: value) of a player
of type (m,P0(pi)) along pi. A player can have many possible “careers” even
along a single path: assuming that with probability pi (i = 1 . . . , k,
∑
i pi = 1)
this player becomes (mi,P1(pi)) and that pi′ = {P1(pi),P2(pi), . . . }, we have
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w(m,pi) = v(m,pi) + δ
∑
i piw(mi, pi
′). We consider coalition-proof stationary
perfect paths only (Bernheim et al., 1987; Morelli and Penelle, 1997). In the
following we spell-out each of these properties:
Coalition-proof refers to the fact that the path pi is stable against deviations
by not only singletons, but also coalitions. The path is stationary in the sense
that if Ph = Pk then Ph+1 = Pk+1, that is, in the same situation players will
make the same choice. Finally, perfectness implies that subpaths of pi must
satisfy the same properties.
Paths are infinite, but can be given by a finite sequence:
pi = {P1,P2, . . . ,Ph, . . . ,Pk−1,Pk} ,
where Pk = Ph, while Pk−1 6= Pi for all i < k − 1, that is, the subpath
{Ph, . . . ,Pk−1} repeated forever. Consequently, one only needs to check a large,
but finite set of possible paths. Ko´czy (2002) and Konishi and Ray (2003)
provide additional results on the properties of such paths.
2.1 Customs unions and externalities
The literature on the welfare effects of customs unions (Bond and Syropoulos,
1996; Syropoulos, 1999; Bond et al., 2004) tends to focus on the overall effects
rather than those on the expanding Union, the entrants and potential entrants in
the process. Exceptions include Kauppi and Widgre´n (2007) studying the effect
of enlargement on the budget and Yi (1996) who focuses on the individual
players and established the following results on the nature of externalities in
such games.
Condition 1 v (ni,P) > v (ni,P ′), where ni ∈ P ∩ P ′ and P is a refinement
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of P ′. This expresses that mergers hurt those outside the merger.
Condition 2 v (nj ,P) < v (k,P ′), where k =
∑j
i=1 ni
1. P = P ′ ∪ {n1, n2, . . . , nj} \ {k} for some partition P0 of n− k,
2. ni ≥ nj ∀i,
that is, a merger with weakly larger coalitions is beneficial.
Condition 3 v (nj ,P) < v (ni + 1,P ′), if P ′ = P \ {ni, nj} ∪ {ni + 1, nj − 1},
ni ≥ nj, that is, a member of a coalition is strictly better off by leaving the
coalition and joining a weakly larger one.
Condition 1 is the basis of the domino theory (Baldwin, 1995) and formalises
that “non-member concerns about [customs union] formation are well-founded”
(Richardson, 1999) confirming that non-EU members feel excluded from an
increasing EU. Conditions 2 and 3 go further: joining a larger group is beneficial
both for individuals and coalitions.1
3 European integration and its externalities
The Yalta Conference divided Europe into East and West. The threat of emerg-
ing Soviet superpower forced allies and enemies alike into cooperation in the
West; for those in the Soviet area of influence the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon) formed and non-participation was not an option. In the
West an accelerated reconstruction started under the Marshall Plan. The two
halves of Europe entered diverging paths of development.
1Bond et al. (2004, Proposition 5.) show that the formation of a free trade area that is
too small with respect to the rest of the world can be welfare-reducing for its members. Their
analysis, however, focuses on the formation of a single group.
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3.1 Integration on the West
The cooperation under the Marshall Plan soon evolved into the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC, in 1951), where the resources of war have been
turned into vehicles of cooperation. As open conflicts of the cold war spared Eu-
rope, the ECSC had a steady development turning into the European Economic
Community (EEC) of Belgium, France, Western Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands (1958). With the Maastricht Treaty (in 1992) the EC be-
comes the European Union (EU) in 1993. It shall not lead to confusion if we
refer to all these as ‘EU.’
Neutral countries, reluctant to join the EU, then consisting solely of NATO
members felt increasingly excluded from European markets (cf. Condition 1,
see also (Baldwin, 1995)). As a compensation the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal formed a looser alliance,
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in 1960 (Iceland joined later, in
1970, Finland in 1986 and Liechtenstein in 1991).
The EFTA has always been smaller than the EU and its members had poor
access to the much larger markets of the “inner six.” By Condition 3 it is
not surprising that soon the United Kingdom and Denmark decided to leave
the EFTA and join the EEC. The condition applies to all EFTAns, so has not
the rest? Firstly observe that both the UK and Denmark are NATO members,
moreover, the EU has started to formulate political goals as well and not all were
in favour of a deeper integration. Norway is a special case: a NATO member,
and has expressed interest in joining the EU already three times, but entry was
voted down by national referenda.
Ireland was the first to join without being a NATO member, probably due
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to its strong economic ties with the UK. Previously unaffiliated countries have
chosen the EU almost unanimously: Greece (1981) and Spain (1986), while
the EFTA could only get Finland, already allied with EFTA from 1961 and
Liechtenstein, already a member via its ties with Switzerland. The EU gradually
won over most EFTA members: Portugal (1986) and Austria, Finland and
Sweden (1995) (Condition 3). It was likely that by 1995 all EFTA members
would join. We have already discussed Norway’s case above, the remaining
EFTA countries Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein are all very strongly
tied with the EU. The first has a tradition of independence that it would like
to keep as its banking industry might rely on it, the latter have conflicts with
EU regulations on fishing and taxes, respectively.
3.2 Integration on the East
With the Comecon an unprecedented, centrally planned economic block formed
in 1949 that sometimes allocated entire industries to certain countries. All this
in the name of efficiency, but the lack of market mechanisms or expertise, the
admission of developing countries, corruption, the resistance of the population
all contributed to the gradual decline and the eventual disbandment in 1991. At
this point members were free to choose their own ways, they inherited distorted
economies and broken trading partners. While foreign investment could help
the first problem quickly establishing trade relations with the West and each
other (Condition 2) was necessary to overcome the second.
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (then: Czech Republic and Slovakia)
have, since the start, been at the forefront of political and economic develop-
ment in the former Eastern Block. Their common past and similar level of
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development made them natural allies. Referring to their historical Visegra´d
summit in 1335 2 these countries formed the Visegra´d Group in 1991 aiming
at a cooperation similar to the Benelux: members are individually too small
to make an impact, the group with 60 million inhabitants is a strong player.
This group focuses on deep rather than wide cooperation and therefore has not
admitted additional members.
The Visegra´d countries have also formed the Central European Free Trade
Agreement, with Slovenia (1996), Romania (1997), Bulgaria (1999), and Croa-
tia (2002), Macedonia (2006), the rest of the former Yugoslavia, Albania and
Moldova (2007) joining later. The CEFTA has never had the ambition beyond
being a vestibule to the EU and its importance has significantly declined when
the founding members left to join the EU. (Cf. Condition 3) In 2006 –already
without the founding members– the agreement was modified and currently cov-
ers little approximately the area of the former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia, plus
Albania and Moldova).
By the time the Comecon has collapsed the EFTA was a dwarf compared
to the EU. The more open, welcoming nature of the EFTA lead to a number
of bilateral agreements, but (by Condition 3) the EU was clearly preferred, and
by 2004 the first waves of Eastern applicants have joined.
This extension was very different from previous ones, but the differences are
not where most seek it: we have seen bigger extensions (in terms of population)
and we have seen extensions with nearly as large differences in productivity.
While in previous extensions substantial efforts have been made to reduce these
2The economic and political agreements between Kings Charles I of Hungary, John of
Bohemia, Casimir III (the Great) of Poland, Margrave Charles of Moravia, etc. at the (then)
Hungarian capital Visegra´d included the creation of a trade route to bypass Vienna.
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differences now –in EU terms– poor entrants could become net contributors. The
new members had to accept major compromises, such as the aforementioned 4%
rule on budget receipts or the restrictions of labour mobility.
By the mid-1990’s the EU has become the dominant trading partner for most
applicants. A repetitive use of Condition 1 shows that it was increasingly unde-
sirable to stay outside this union. Focussing only on the economic motivations,
the entrants of 2004 were much more ready to make concessions in exchange of
the entry than applicants ever before (Baldwin, 1994, pp130-139).
4 The Accession Game
In the following we define the accession game, a special case of the game dis-
cussed above. A number of (singleton) applicant seek entry to a union, repre-
sented by a large coalition. We assume that the union monotone increasing :
no player leaves it. This is an assumption to simplify our solution, but it is not
unfounded: Despite an exit clause in the Maastricht Treaty and threats both to
leave (France, 1965–66), and to expel, none of the joining members have left the
EU (Greenland left in 1985 after it was granted home rule, though technically
it has never joined, it became a member via Denmark.).
The focus of the solution is on the conflict between the union and the appli-
cants. Each step of the game can be pictured as a bargaining procedure: If no
membership offers are made by the union or the offers are not accepted the ap-
plicants repartition themselves to obtain the highest value without acceptance
– we call this the disagreement partition. When the union makes its most pre-
ferred offer those addressed accept only if joining is beneficial, keeping in mind
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that the applicants without an offer will play their disagreement partition.
Before we go to the general results, consider the following example.
v(m,P) m
P 1 2 3 ≥ s
P6= {s+ 3} 4
P5= {s+ 2, 1} 0 5
P4= {s+ 1, 2} 2 6
P3={s+ 1, 1, 1} 1 7
P2= {s, 3} 3 3
P1= {s, 2, 1} 1 4 4
P0= {s, 1, 1, 1} 2 5
Table 1: Payoffs of game G
Example Consider the game in Table 1. As the union does not break up,
there is no need to consider partitions with smaller unions. We solve the game
using backward induction.
No applicants: the solution is trivial, w(s+ 3,P6) = 4/(1− δ).
1 applicant: By monotonicity, Πf (P5) = {P5,P6}. If a membership offer is
not made or accepted, the disagreement partition is played and by stationarity
the game stays at this partition for ever after. The applicants’ payoff is 0 at P5
while the union gets w(s+ 2,P5) = 5/(1− δ). Since w(s+ 2,P5) = 5/(1− δ) >
w(s+ 3,P6) = 4/(1− δ) no offer is made and w(1,P5) = 0.
2 applicants: The disagreement partition is P4 giving w(s+1,P4) = 6/(1−δ)
to the union. Since P4 >s P5 >s P6 the union does not make an offer.
3 applicants: We deal with P0 and P2 first. Although for the applicants P2
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is no better than playing P1, it –credibly– gives the union a lower payoff. The
disagreement partition is P2 with w(3,P2) = 1/(1−δ) and w(s,P2) = 3/(1−δ).
This is the lowest possible payoff for the union. The applicants prefer P6 and
hence this is played.
Stage I Stage II Stage III Stage IV
1 P4 > P6 > P3 > P1 > P5 P4 > P3 > P1 > P5 P4 > P3 > P5 P4 > P3
2 P5 > P6 = P3 = P1 > P4 P5 > P3 > P1 = P4 P5 > P3 > P4 P3 > P4
s P3 > P4 > P5 > P1 = P6 P3 > P4 > P5 > P1 P3 > P4 > P5 P3 > P4
Table 2: Preference orderings for P1 in game G without transfers.
In partition P1 the applicants have inhomogeneous preferences. Since the
pair does not want to merge with the singleton, the disagreement outcome is P1,
giving w(1,P1) = 1/(1− δ), w(2,P1) = 4/(1− δ), w(s,P1) = 4/(1− δ). Table 2
summarises how preference orderings (marked “ > ”) are evaluated. In stage
I we remove the partitions that are worse than the disagreement partition for
the union (P6). From here the partitions are eliminated from backwards. The
last chance to improve payoffs before disagreement is P5. In stage II the pair is
willing to accept this, so the “offer” P1 is never made. Foreseeing these actions,
the singleton will accept the previous offer in stage III, P4, as it improves its
payoff, and it can enforce it. This is the worst possible outcome for the pair, it
is willing to accept the previous offer P3, and can enforce it, and hence this is
the outcome for the game. The union exploited the tension among applicants
very well: its first offer is accepted, for the applicants P6 Pareto-dominates this
outcome. Table 3 summarises the calculations.
If we do allow transfers among applicants the singleton can compensate the
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Game G P m pi∗ w
0-applicants P6 s+ 3
{P6} 4 11−δ
1 0
1-applicant P5
s+ 2
{P5}
5 1
1−δ
2 2 1
1−δ
P4
s+ 1
{P4}
6 1
1−δ
2-applicants
1 1 + 2 δ
1−δ
P3
s+ 1
{P3,P4}
7 + 6 δ
1−δ
3 3 + 4 δ
1−δ
P2
s
{P2,P6}
3 + 4 δ
1−δ
1 1 + δ + 2 δ
2
1−δ
3-applicants P1 2
{P1,P3,P4} 4 11−δ
s 4 + 7δ + 6 δ
2
1−δ
1 2 + 4 δ
1−δ
P0
s
{P0,P6}
5 + 4 δ
1−δ
Table 3: Values and optimal paths for game G.
2-coalition when moving to P2, and thus the partition offering the lowest value
to the union becomes a credible threat, and P6 is played. Remarkably, transfers
never take place, as the threat is never executed; as soon as the union believes
that transfers could take place, a better outcome is achieved.
This –perhaps artificial– example perfectly illustrates the issues that can
arise in extensions like the ones in 1995 or in 2004. The EU has no economic
incentives to accept a single poor applicant3. The integration of several appli-
cants outside the union results in negative externalities to the the union. These
3Single country extensions in the past have been more on political than economic grounds.
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externalities are probably not severe in relative terms, but, as in this example,
may just outweigh the cost of admitting new members.
This is also an example that satisfies Yi’s conditions, but where the grand
coalition does not necessarily form. This can be explained by the fact that we
do not have an open membership game, that is, entry requires EU-permission
and that we ignore countries that are neither members nor applicants.
4.1 The general form
In the general accession game we allow transfers among the applicants. Such
a game even with an arbitrary number of applicants simplifies to a two-player
game between the union S and the applicants, denoted A. At each partition
P, given the corresponding Πf (P) the next move is determined using backward
induction: The case with no applicants is trivial. Given that for all games with
less than k applicants the solution is found, we solve the game with k applicants.
Given P both the union and the applicants can calculate their value for
each P ′ ∈ Πf (P): If at least one of the applicants is admitted, we use the –
known– solution of the game with the remaining applicants. If no offer is made,
applicants choose the disagreement outcome and this is the end of the game, so
the value is the present value of a constant payoff stream. Given these values
the union will make offers as long as its value is beyond the disagreement value:
PD ∈ arg max
P′∈Πf
s∈P′
{
wA (P ′)}
Applicants choose their most preferred offer; formally we have the solution:
P∗ = arg max
P∈Πf (P0)
{
wA (P) ∣∣wS (P) > wS (PD)} (1)
If offers are made by the applicants we get a similar formula, while if offers are
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made simultaneously we get a bargaining problem.
Once these equilibrium offers are known, we solve for optimal paths, yet
again, using backward induction. Let Πa = {P ∈ Π|n− s = a} denote the set
of partitions with exactly a applicants. For a = 0, Π = {{n}} and the solution
is trivial. When solving for a we assume that for all P ∈ Πk with 0 ≤ k < a the
solution is known. Now let
ΠaD = arg maxP∈Πa
vA (P) the collection of disagreement outcomes,
Π+ =
{
P ∈
n−s0⋃
a=0
Πa
∣∣∣∣∣wS (P) > minPD∈ΠaD wS (PD)
}
the set of offers,
Pa ∈ arg max
P∈Π+
wA (P) the accepted offer in the case of a applicants.
Let b ∈ N such that Pa ∈ Πb, that is, a− b applicants join under the accepted
offer. Then starting from the initial partition P ∈ Πa we have:
pi∗ (P) =

{P,Pa} if b = a
{P} ∪ pi∗ (Pa) otherwise,
(2a)
wA (P) =

vA (P) + δ vA(Pa)1−δ if b = a
vA (P) + δwA (Pa) otherwise,
(2b)
wS (P) =

vS (P) + δ vS(Pa)1−δ if b = a
vS (P) + δwS (Pa) otherwise,
(2c)
5 Conclusions
Baldwin (1994, pp130-139) describes the “hub-and-spoke bilateralism” model,
where the European Union has arrangements with each applicant separately. In
our model this corresponds to the union and a set of singletons. This setup is
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favourable for the Union, but not for the applicants. Candidates may improve
their average position by forming a coalition, such as the aforementioned EFTA,
Visegra´d or the Baltic countries have.
Our model was intentionally kept simple, even simplistic. The assumption
that all countries are the same seems the strongest one, although the model
already contains the tools to relax this: by representing countries by coali-
tions of proportional sizes and restricting Πf , size differences can be introduced.
Asymmetry can be introduced by considering a discrete partition function, our
solutions are easily adaptable.
The main limitation is of course the fact that we focus on a single aspect
of the process: the strategic application for membership, our link to the inter-
national trade literature is only via the results of (Yi, 1997). We expect that a
deeper study would refine our solutions.
There are some questions that we leave open. In larger games without the
monotonicity assumption loops can arise and finding the solution becomes more
difficult. The present model is still very simple and extensions can prove to
be more descriptive. Morelli and Penelle (1997) discuss how different utility
transfers affect the accession path; our example shows that even the possibility
of transfers can improve the outcome.
Despite all these limitations there is a clear message: the direct route is
not the quickest route. A strong group of applicants may enter with greater
success than individually. While the EU is unlikely to grow indefinitely, certain
aspects of the union will possibly be enjoyed by many, perhaps even beyond
Europe. Those interested should prepare for a long fight and prepare strong
outside options.
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